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Editorial note
Takis Tridimas *

RECOVERY PLAN AND RULE OF LAW CONDITIONALITY:
A NEW ERA BECKONS?
By any standards, 2020 has been a painful year. A health crisis
of historic proportions is still unravelling and, in addition to its human
cost, it has far reaching adverse socio-economic repercussions the full
extent of which is difﬁcult to predict. The year also sees the curtains
closing on the United Kingdom membership, a deﬁ ning event in the evolution of the Union. For the UK, withdrawal marks the greatest constitutional reversal since the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. For the
EU, it shatters the irreversibility of the ever closer union narrative. 2020
also marks the end of a tumultuous decade where the EU has been beset
by many emergencies, including the eurozone and migration crises. On
a more positive note, the twilight of the year saw the adoption of a series
of measures bringing into effect a comprehensive recovery package to
counter the economic effects of COVID-19, including the accompanying
rule of law conditionality Regulation.1 These make for seminal developments in EU law and deserve attention.
Recovery package and the new EU budget
In May 2020, following the invitation of the European Council, the
Commission presented an ambitious recovery plan to counter the economic impact of the COVID-19 epidemic.2 The plan, hailed somewhat
over-ambitiously as Europe’s ‘Hamilton moment’, proposed ‘Next Generation EU’, a recovery instrument embedded in the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021−2027. The objective was to provide a
‘comprehensive, bold and sustained’ response to the crisis and plan long

*

Takis Tridimas (ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1698-5986), Professor of European Law, Dickson
Poon School of Law, King’s College London, and Professor and Nancy A Patterson Distinguished Scholar, Pennsylvania State University, takis.tridimas@kcl.ac.uk. DOI: 10.3935/
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1
Regulation 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [2020] OJ L433/I/1.
2
Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’
COM(2020) 456 ﬁnal.
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term for the well-being of the Union.3 In its meeting of July 2020, after
marathon negotiations, the European Council reached a comprehensive
agreement on the EU budget and a recovery package4 along the lines
proposed by the Commission. The package runs to €1,824.3 billion and
combines the MFF (€1,074.3 billion) and the Next Generation EU (NGEU)
instrument of €750 billion, the latter being equivalent to approximately
5¼ of EU annual GDP. The goal is to generate the funds necessary for
sustainable and resilient recovery whilst supporting the EU’s green and
digital priorities.5
Although the package was politically agreed in July, it was not
transposed into law as there was an outstanding item: rule of law conditionality. This emerged in the light of the Commission’s original proposal
dating back to 2018,6 which had sought to link observance of rule of law
standards with sound ﬁnancial management, and in the shadow of the
rule of law regression in Poland and Hungary which continues to exercise
Europe. In its July conclusions, the European Council proclaimed that
the Union’s ﬁ nancial interests would be protected in accordance with the
values of Article 2 TEU and stated that a regime of conditionality to protect the budget and the NGEU would be introduced.7 There followed an
agreement at Council level on the contents of the conditionality regime8
and a juxtaposition with Poland and Hungary who, in a joint declaration,
objected to the link between the rule of law and the EU budget.9
In its 10−11 December 2020 meeting, the European Council reached
a compromise which opened the road for the adoption of the recovery
package.10 The package is based on four pillars. A Council Regulation
3
Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a Council Decision on the system of Own Resources
of the European Union’ COM(2020) 445 ﬁnal Brussels, 1.
4
See Conclusions of the Special meeting of the European Council (17, 18, 19, 20 and 21
July 2020) EUCO 10/20, CO EUR 8, CONCL 4, Brussels, 21 July 2020 (‘July Conclusions’).
5

See July Conclusions (n 4) para A2.

6

Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on
the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deﬁciencies as regards the rule
of law in the Member States’ COM(2018) 324 ﬁnal.
7

See July Conclusions (n 4) para A24 and annex to the conclusions, paras 22−23.

8

See the text of the mandate granted by COREPER on 30 September 2020 for the negotiations with Parliament: Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021−2027 and Recovery Package − Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, Interinstitutional File:
2018/0136(COD), 11322/20, Brussels, 30 September 2020.
9
See joint declaration by the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Poland, 26 November
2020 <https://visegradpost.com/en/2020/11/26/eu-rule-of-law-joint-declaration-of-theprime-minister-of-poland-and-the-prime-minister-of-hungary/> accessed 31 December
2020.
10

European Council meeting (10 and 11 December 2020) Conclusions, EUCO 22/20, CO
EUR 17 CONCL 8, Brussels, 11 December 2020 (‘December Conclusions’).
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laying down the multiannual ﬁ nancial framework for the years 2021 to
2027 (Regulation No 2020/2093);11 a Council Decision on the system of
own resources of the European Union (Decision 2020/2053);12 a European Parliament and Council Regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (Regulation 2020/2092);13
and a Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Recovery and Resilience
Facility, on which, at the time of writing, provisional agreement has been
reached between the European Parliament and the Council.
Under the agreed package, to fund the NGEU, the Commission will be
able to borrow up to €750 billion in 2018 prices on the ﬁnancial markets
to be used for loans up to €360 billion and grants up to €390 billion.14
The capital raised is to be repaid by 2058.15 Authority to the Commission
to borrow is granted by the new Own Resources Decision adopted pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, under the terms of which the decision may not
come into force before it is approved by the Member States in accordance
with their respective constitutional requirements.16 The powers granted to
the Commission to borrow are limited in size, duration and scope.17 The
amounts available under the NGEU will be allocated to seven programmes
but the lion’s share (€672.5 billion) goes to the Recovery and Resilience
Facility (RRF).18 The intention is to channel funds to the countries and
sectors most affected by the crisis. 70% under the grants of the RRF will
be committed in 2021 and 2022 and 30% will be committed in 2023. Allocations from the RRF in 2021−2022 will be established according to the
Commission’s allocation criteria taking into account the respective living
standards, size and unemployment levels of the Member States.19
In line with the principles of good governance, Member States are
to prepare national recovery and resilience plans for 2021−2023. The
plans will be assessed by the Commission and must be consistent with
11

Council Regulation No 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual ﬁnancial framework for
the years 2021 to 2027 [2020] OJ L433 I/11.

12

Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own
resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU [2020] OJ L424/1.

13

Regulation 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [2020] OJ L433/I/1.

14

See July Conclusions (n 4) para A6 and Council Decision, 2020/2053 (n 12) Article 5(1).

15

Council Decision 2020/2053 (n 12) Article 5(2).

16

ibid, Article 5.

17

July Conclusions (n 4) para A4; and see Council Decision, 2020/2053 (n 12) Article 5.

18

See July Conclusions (n 4) para A14. The programmes are: Recovery and Resilience
Facility: €672.5 billion (loans: €360 billion, grants: €312.5 billion); ReactEU: €47.5 billion;
Horizon Europe: €5 billion; InvestEU: €5.6 billion; Rural Development: €7.5 billion; Just
Transition Fund (JTF): €10 billion; RescEU: €1.9 billion.
19

See Special European Council, 17−21 July 2020 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/07/17-21/> accessed 31 December 2020.
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the country speciﬁc recommendations made in the context of the European Semester. They must also contribute to growth and job creation
and advance green and digital transitions. The plans will be adapted as
necessary in 2022. Their assessment is to be approved by the Council by
a qualiﬁed majority on a proposal by the Commission. The disbursement
of grants will take place only if agreed milestones and targets set out in
the plans are fulﬁlled. Where one or more Member States consider that
there are serious deviations from the milestones and targets, they may
request that the President of the European Council refer the matter to
the next European Council.20
Provision is also made for a new own resource of the EU to ﬁ nance
the NGEU, namely a levy on non-recyclable plastic packaging that will
be introduced in 2021.21 In addition, it is envisaged that the Commission
will put forward a proposal for a carbon adjustment measure and a digital levy, both of which are to be introduced at the latest by 1 January
2023.22 Notably, 30% of the total expenditure from the MFF and NGEU
will target climate-related projects. Expenses under the MFF and NGEU
will comply with the EU’s objective of climate neutrality by 2050, the
EU’s 2030 climate targets and the Paris Agreement.23
Distinct features and assessment
The EU’s response to the COVID-19 crisis was rapid, ambitious and
decisive. The new package has good prospects to succeed although the
self-imposed triptych against which it is to be judged, ‘convergence, resilience and transformation’, is a tall order.24 The EU’s response to the crisis
was both joint and innovative.25 It provides for the ﬁrst time for collective
debt at European Union level. It is a form of ﬁ nancial risk mutualisation
that has eluded the response to the Eurozone crisis and enhances solidarity and the idea of togetherness. This is particularly important as the

20

July Conclusions (n 4) para A19.

21

Decision 2020/2053 (n 12) Article 2.

22

See July Conclusions (n 4) para A29. The Commission is also to put forward a proposal
on a revised emissions trading scheme (ETS), possibly extending it to the aviation and maritime sectors. The possibility of introducing a Financial Transaction Tax will be looked at in
the course of the next MFF.

23

See Special European Council (n 19).

24

In presenting his proposals to the European Council, its President, Mr Charles Michel,
stated as follows: ‘The goals of our recovery can be summarised in three words: ﬁrst convergence, second resilience and third transformation. Concretely, this means: repairing
the damage caused by COVID-19, reforming our economies and remodelling our societies’. Press release, 10 July 2020 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/07/17-21/> accessed 31 December 2020.

25

See Special European Council (n 19).
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impact and costs of the pandemic appear to be unevenly spread in terms
of sectors, Member States, and speciﬁc regions. A second distinct feature
is that the ﬁ nancial package is based on the disciplines of EU law proper. This makes a break with the emphasis on intergovernmentalism that
characterised the response to the Eurozone crisis and which has been
endorsed, and even encouraged, by the Court of Justice.26 Thirdly, the
universal and comprehensive character of the measures advances an integrated conception of the EU interest. By linking disbursement of funds
with progress in strategic areas, the package interlaces the response
to the pandemic with policy priorities and is forward looking. It is not
simply a response to a crisis but a blueprint for development. Furthermore, this is the ﬁ rst EU budget which is linked to climate objectives,
even though perhaps more timidly than one would have hoped. The measures also enhance the presence of the EU in matters of economic policy,
strengthening the subtle but steady shift of emphasis from the internal
market to EMU governance as the prevalent model of integration. The
package, built in response to a genuine crisis, sends a positive message
to citizens. At the same time, there is no denying that it gives more power
to the EU and thereby, by way of collateral effect, facilitates empire building. Although the funds that will be made available to the Member States
are not subject to conditionality in the way it applied to ESM ﬁ nancial
assistance, the package does place budgetary and macro-economic surveillance at the heart of the scheme and advances conditionality as a
constitutional virtue.
Rule of law conditionality: high politics and low protection?
It is telling of the regression in the rule of law standards that has
beset the EU in recent years that the most controversial issue faced by
the European Council was the rule of law conditionality mechanism to
accompany the recovery plan. Prior to the December European Council meeting, two opposite camps emerged. Hungary and Poland, both
of which are widely viewed as backsliding on rule of law standards, appeared prepared to veto the EU budget and the recovery package unless
the ties between spending and the rule of law became looser. In the
event, the ﬁ nal text agreed is, in terms of substance, close to the September Council draft27 although some concessions were obtained in the
European Council Conclusions.
26

See, eg in relation to the migration crisis, Case T-257/16 NM v European Council
ECLI:EU:T:2017:130, and, in relation to the EuroGroup, Joined Cases C-105/15 P to
C-109/15 P Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB ECLI:EU:C:2016:702, and, especially,
the recent judgment in Joined Cases C597/18 P, C598/18 P, C603/18 P and C604/18 P
Council v Chrysostomides ECLI:EU:C:2020:1028.

27

See (n 8).
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Regulation 2020/2092 on the rule of law conditionality28 is a key part
of the package. Its origins lie in a Commission proposal submitted in 2018
which linked prudent ﬁnancial management with respect for the rule of
law and sought to protect the Union’s budget in the case of generalised rule
of law deﬁciencies in a Member State.29 It was intended to apply from 2021
with the start of the MFF 2021−2027 and came back to the fore following
the recovery plan submitted by the Commission in May 2020. The Regulation was adopted by qualiﬁed majority following the European Council
meeting of December 2020. Hungary and Poland voted against it30 and it
is expected that its validity will be challenged before the CJEU. In comparison to the Commission’s original proposal, the agreed text provides
for additional process and substantive safeguards to protect the interests
of Member States and reduce the discretion of the Commission although
in some limited respects it goes further than the Commission’s proposal.
The Regulation is based on Article 322(1)(a) TFEU and requires appropriate measures to be taken where rule of law breaches affect or seriously risk affecting the principles of sound ﬁnancial management or
the protection of the ﬁ nancial interests of the Union. The underlying
rationale is that respect for the rule of law is an essential precondition
for compliance with the principles of sound ﬁ nancial management enshrined in Article 317 TFEU. Such management can only be ensured if
national authorities act in accordance with the law, effectively pursue
cases of fraud, corruption, and conﬂict of interest, and unlawful decisions are subject to review by an independent judiciary.31 The Regulation
provides for the conditions under which measures may be taken, their
contents, the procedure for their adoption, and their lifting. It is to apply
from 1 January 202132 and its provisions may eventually be included in
the Financial Regulation33 when it is next revised.34 The present piece
28

Regulation 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [2020] OJ L433 I/1.

29

See (n 6).

30

Hungary and Poland voted against the regulation. See voting result, Position of the
Council at ﬁrst reading with a view to the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the
Union budget, Interinstitutional File: 2018/0136 (COD), Brussels, 14 December 2020 (OR
en) 14020/20.

31

Preamble, recitals 7 and 8.

32

Article 10. It is not intended to have retroactive effect. Under the December 2020 European Council conclusions, the measures will apply only in relation to budgetary commitments
starting under the new Multiannual Financial Framework, including Next Generation EU.
See European Council meeting (10 and 11 December 2020), Conclusions, EUCO 22/20 CO
EUR 17 CONCL 8, Brussels, 11 December 2020, Conclusions, para 2(k).

33
34

Regulation 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018.

See Joint statement by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed to the
European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 December 2020 on the Council position
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provides an overview of the Regulation and focuses on the conditions
that must be fulﬁlled for measures to be taken and the decision-making
process.
Conditions
For measures to be taken against a Member State, two conditions
must be fulﬁlled. There must, ﬁrst, be breaches of the principles of the
rule of law and, secondly, those breaches must affect or seriously risk
affecting the sound ﬁ nancial management of the Union budget or the
protection of the ﬁ nancial interests of the Union in a sufﬁciently direct
way.35 Those conditions have undergone some changes since the Commission’s original proposal and it is worth examining them in detail.
Breaches of the principles of the rule of law
The ﬁrst condition is that there must be breaches of the principles
of the rule of law. The Regulation contains a comprehensive deﬁ nition of
the rule of law and makes it clear that the concept must be understood
in conjunction with the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.36
Under the Commission’s original proposal, a prerequisite for the imposition of measures was that there must be a generalised deﬁciency
as regards the rule of law.37 ‘Generalised deﬁciency’ was deﬁ ned as a
widespread or recurrent practice or omission, or measure which affects
the rule of law.38 The above terms have been replaced by the condition
that there must be ‘breaches of the principles of the rule of law’.39 This is
a stricter condition. The term breach implies a violation whilst the term
deﬁciency is open-ended, indicating lack of appropriate standards which
may not necessarily cross the threshold of illegality.40 The term ‘breach-

at ﬁrst reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget
(09980/1/2020 − C9-0407/2020 − 2018/0136(COD)), <www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/TA-9-2020-0356_EN.html#title1> accessed 31 December 2020.
35

Article 4(1).

36

Under Article 2(a), the concept includes the principles of legality, implying a transparent,
accountable, democratic and pluralistic law-making process; legal certainty; prohibition of
arbitrariness of the executive powers; effective judicial protection, including access to justice, by independent and impartial courts, also as regards fundamental rights; separation
of powers; and non-discrimination and equality before the law.

37

See Commission Proposal (n 6) Article 3(1).

38

ibid, Article 2(b).

39

Article 4(1).

40

The December 2020 European Council Conclusions expressly state that the Regulation
does not relate to generalised deﬁciencies. See December Conclusions (n 10) para 2(f).

XIV

es’ in the plural, which is consistent throughout the Regulation,41 may
suggest that a single breach does not sufﬁce. The Regulation, however,
does not appear to exclude individual breaches. Unlike the Commission’s
original proposal, the ﬁnal text does not require that the violation must
be widespread or recurrent. The objectives of the Regulation countenance
that interpretation. A single but serious breach falls well within the mischief that the Regulation seeks to counter. Whilst perhaps an isolated
breach resulting from administrative practice may not sufﬁce, the term
breaches is best understood as having a qualitative rather than a quantitative character. This is further supported by the preamble which states
that rule of law breaches can seriously harm the ﬁnancial interests of the
Union and that that ‘is the case for individual breaches […] and even more
so for breaches that are widespread or due to recurrent practices or omissions by public authorities, or to general measures adopted by such authorities’.42 Legislation or administrative rules which run counter to the
rule of law may amount to ‘breaches’ since they are of general application.
Breaches may result from any branch of government or any authority exercising public power. In terms of frequency, there is a ﬁne line as to when
occasional violations by the administration or the judiciary cease to be
viewed as insigniﬁcant and become actionable. Seriousness, frequency,
and responses by the authorities in correcting errors are important factors. There is however no need to establish a pattern of breaches.
Under Article 3, the following may be indicative of breaches of the
principles of the rule of law:
(a) endangering the independence of the judiciary;
(b) failing to prevent, correct or sanction arbitrary or unlawful decisions by public authorities, including by law-enforcement authorities, withholding ﬁnancial and human resources affecting their proper functioning or failing to ensure the absence of conﬂicts of interest;
(c) limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, including through restrictive procedural rules and lack of implementation of judgments, or limiting the effective investigation, prosecution
or sanctioning of breaches of law.
The violations listed are widely phrased and can be the result of
either law or practice.
The Regulation provides for a closed list of areas that the rule of law
breaches must concern. In summary, under Article 4(2), these are the
following:
41

See Article 1, Article 3, and Article 4(1).

42

See preamble, recital 15 (emphasis added).
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(a) the proper functioning of the authorities implementing the Union
budget, including loans and other instruments guaranteed by the
Union budget, in particular in the context of public procurement or
grant procedures;
(b) the proper functioning of the authorities carrying out ﬁnancial
control, monitoring and audit;
(c) the proper functioning of investigation and prosecution services
in relation to the investigation and prosecution of fraud, including
tax fraud, corruption or other breaches of EU law relating to the implementation of the budget or to the protection of the EU ﬁnancial
interests;
(d) the effective judicial review by independent courts of actions or
omissions by the authorities referred to in points (a), (b) and (c);
(e) the prevention and sanctioning of fraud, including tax fraud, corruption or other breaches of EU law relating to the implementation
of the budget or to the protection of the EU ﬁnancial interests, and
the imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties;
(f) the recovery of funds unduly paid;
(g) effective and timely cooperation with OLAF and, subject to the
participation of the Member State concerned, with EPPO;
(h) other situations or conduct of authorities that are relevant to the
sound ﬁnancial management of the Union budget or the protection
of the ﬁnancial interests of the Union.
In contrast to the Commission’s proposal which contained an indicative list, the above list is a closed one.43 Nonetheless, its exhaustive
character is somewhat compromised by its ﬁnal catch-all clause in Article 4(2)(h).
Link between the rule of law violations and EU ﬁnances
Under Article 4(1), the second prerequisite for the imposition of measures is that the breaches of the principles of the rule of law must affect
or ‘seriously’ risk affecting the sound ﬁ nancial management of the EU
budget or the protection of the EU ﬁnancial interests ‘in a sufﬁciently
direct way’. The glosses in quotation marks were absent in the Commission’s initial proposal.44 The ﬁ nal text succeeds in establishing a clearer
43
44

Article 4(2) of the Regulation. Cf Article 3(1) of the Commission’s Proposal (n 6).

See Commission Proposal (n 6) Article 3(1). In some respects the language of the Regulation has been tightened (see eg Article 4(1) of the Regulation vis-à-vis Article 3, opening
paragraph of the Commission’s proposal) but in others extended (see Article 4(2), points (c)
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connection between rule of law violations and the ﬁ nancial interests of
the Union, but it is still wide. The term ‘protection of the ﬁ nancial interests of the Union’ is wider than the sound ﬁ nancial management of the
Union budget and may lend itself to an open-ended interpretation.
The key consideration here is the degree of proximity required. When
can a rule of law breach that concerns one of the areas listed in Article
4(2) be said to risk seriously affecting the sound management of the budget or the EU ﬁnancial interests in ‘a sufﬁciently direct way’? The statements included in the European Council Conclusions are of limited help.
It is stated there that the measures must be proportionate to the impact
of the breaches on the sound ﬁ nancial management of the budget or the
Union’s ﬁ nancial interests, and the causal link between such breaches
and such negative consequences must be sufﬁciently direct and duly
established. The mere ﬁ nding that a breach of the rule of law has taken
place does not sufﬁce to trigger the mechanism.45 It is further stated that
the triggering factors set out in the Regulation are to be read and applied
as a closed list of homogenous elements and not be open to factors or
events of a different nature.46 These statements however are in themselves ambiguous and their legal signiﬁcance is unclear as the European
Council does not have authority to interpret authentically EU law.
The expression ‘sufﬁciently directly’ should be understood in the
light of the objectives of the Regulation. The underlying idea is that there
is a strong link between, on one hand, respect for the rule of law and,
on the other hand, mutual trust and ﬁnancial solidarity among Member
States and among the EU and the Member States. The condition is therefore fulﬁlled where a violation of the rule of law is liable to affect directly
that mutual trust. The fact that a breach may affect more other areas
not concerned with EU ﬁ nances does not mean that it does not affect
directly the ﬁ nancial interests of the Union. Also, it is not necessary that
the breach must be intended to target one or more of the areas listed in
Article 4(2) or to affect the EU budget or the EU ﬁ nancial interests. The
impact on the EU interests must be direct but not actual; potential effect
sufﬁces.47 Political interference with the prosecution of crime other than
ﬁ nancial crime may not meet the test of directness but context is everything. If such interference is likely to create a climate of fear or occurs
at a senior level of the prosecution authority it may pass the threshold.
The more fundamental or systemic the breach is, the easier it is to satisfy the requirement of directness. Would a statute that prejudices judi(e)(h) of the Regulation vis-à-vis Article 3(1) of the Commission Proposal).
45

July Conclusions (n 4) para 2(e).

46

ibid, para 2(f).

47

See Article 5(3) of the Regulation.
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cial independence such as that found to be incompatible with EU law in
Commission v Poland48 meet those conditions? A constitutional court or a
supreme court exercises overarching jurisdiction and, given its position
at the apex of the judicial hierarchy, has a special role as the guardian
of justice. Where the appointment of its members is found to breach the
principle of judicial independence, such a breach reverberates throughout the legal system and is liable to affect the administration of justice
in all areas, including those listed in Article 4(2). It certainly poses a
serious risk of affecting the protection of EU ﬁ nancial interests, but does
it do so in a sufﬁciently direct way? The link can be made where there is
pending relevant litigation.
The conundrum of guidelines
Notably, the July European Council Conclusions add a proviso to the
application of the conditionality mechanism. They state that, with a view
to ensuring that it is applied objectively, fairly, and with due regard to
the equal treatment of Member States, the Commission intends to adopt
guidelines on the way it will apply the Regulation, including a methodology for carrying out its assessment. Such guidelines are to be developed in
close consultation with the Member States and, until they are ﬁnalised,
the Commission will not propose measures under the Regulation.49
This is an arrangement introduced to accommodate the concerns
of Poland and Hungary. In strict law, the adoption of guidelines does not
appear necessary as a condition for the application of the Regulation. It is
correct that guidelines may be helpful in the interests of equal treatment,
where the EU is empowered to impose sanctions. Thus, in the context of
Article 260 TFEU, the CJEU has held that, in the absence of provisions
in the Treaties, the Commission may adopt guidelines for determining
how the lump sums or penalty payments which it intends to propose
to the Court are calculated.50 Such guidelines help to ensure that the
Commission acts in a manner which is transparent, foreseeable and
consistent with legal certainty, and are designed to achieve proportionality in the amounts of the penalty payments.51 However, the adoption of
guidelines for the application of the Regulation is not a sine qua non. The
Regulation does not provide for the imposition of ﬁnes but the suspension of payments due. Also, the terms of the Regulation do not have an
inordinate degree of vagueness or ambiguity such that would make nec-

48

Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland ECLI:EU:C:2019:531.

49

July Conclusions (n 4) para 2(c).

50

See Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece ECLI:EU:C:2000:356, para 84.

51

ibid, para 87.
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essary the issue of guidelines before it can be applied. The minutes of the
Council meeting where the Regulation was adopted include a statement
by the Commission where the latter conﬁrms the declarations included
in the European Council’s meeting.52 The legal effect of the statement is
debatable. In Antonissen,53 the CJEU held that a declaration recorded in
the Council minutes at the time of the adoption of a measure cannot be
used for the purpose of interpreting it where no reference is made to the
content of the declaration in the wording of the provision in question.
Whether the Commission’s statement would be capable of giving rise to a
legitimate expectation on the part of Member States that the Regulation
will not be applied is an open question. Nonetheless, as a matter of good
governance, one should expect the Commission to issue such guidelines.
Measures that may be taken
Article 5(1) outlines the measures that may be taken where the conditions of Article 4 are fulﬁlled. They are wide-ranging and include, inter
alia, suspension of payments, disbursements, or commitments, suspension of the approval of programmes, prohibition on entering into new
agreements on loans or other instruments guaranteed by the Union budget, and a reduction of pre-ﬁ nancing. The measures must satisfy the
principle of proportionality.54 Care is taken to ensure the interests of
the intended beneﬁciaries of the funds frozen.55 This is however not an
easy task as, ultimately, the duty to effect payment rests with the default
Member State. The failure of a Member State to fulﬁ l its obligation to
make payment may in itself be actionable under Francovich56 and can
lead to enforcement proceedings by the Commission.
The July European Council Conclusions state that application of
the mechanism will respect its subsidiary character. Measures should
be considered only where other procedures set out in Union law, including under the Common Provisions Regulation, the Financial Regulation
or infringement procedures under the Treaty, would not allow to protect
the Union budget more effectively.57 The subsidiary character of the Reg-
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ulation, however, is not reﬂected in the main text. The preamble states
that measures under it are necessary ‘in particular’ in cases where other
procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the budget to be
protected more effectively.58 In many cases, it would make sense to have
recourse to alternative means of enforcement but, if the conditions speciﬁed in the Regulation are fulﬁlled, the taking of measures under it is
not excluded on the ground that the same conduct can also be remedied
by other means.
Decision-making
The procedure for the adoption of measures gives a central role to the
Commission but entrusts the Council with the ﬁnal decision. The Regulation strengthens the process rights of the Member State concerned and
replaces the negative resolution procedure envisaged in the Commission’s proposal with ordinary QMV. Essentially, where the Commission
has reasonable grounds to consider that the conditions set out in Article
4 are fulﬁlled, it initiates a process which has three phases covering
respectively fact ﬁ nding, bargaining, and decision-making.59 The Member State must provide the Commission with the information requested
and may propose remedial measures to address the Commission’s concerns.60 Under the ﬁ nal text of the Regulation, the Member State has
two chances to present its views. First, when it answers questions raised
by the Commission and also, subsequently, if the Commission intends
to make a proposal to the Council. At that stage, it must give the Member State the opportunity to submit its observations, in particular on
the proportionality of the envisaged measures, within one month.61 The
Regulation stresses the importance of ensuring that the Commission’s
assessment is fair, objective, and transparent.62
The replacement of reverse QMV with positive Council action loosens
the technocratic grip to the beneﬁt of politicisation. Under the Commission’s proposal, if the Commission considered that there was a violation,
it would submit a proposal to the Council.63 The proposed measures were
deemed to have been adopted unless the Council decided, by qualiﬁed
majority, to reject them within one month.64 Under the Regulation, where
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the Commission considers that the conditions of Article 4 are fulﬁlled
and that any remedial measures proposed by the Member State are not
adequate, the Commission must submit a proposal to the Council within
one month of receiving the Member State’s observations.65 The proposal
must set out the speciﬁc grounds and evidence on which the Commission based its ﬁ ndings. The Council must adopt an implementing decision within one month of receiving the Commission’s proposal.66
Thus, under the Regulation, unless the Council decides to act within the time limits prescribed, no measures are imposed. In adopting the
Commission’s proposal, the Council acts by the default procedure, ie
qualiﬁed majority.67 The Council may also amend the Commission’s proposal by qualiﬁed majority.68 This replaces the general rule under which
the Council may change the Commission’s proposal only by unanimity.69
The Regulation includes elaborate provisions on the lifting of the
measures to ensure that they are not in force any longer than necessary.
There is both an obligation of regular review on the part of the Commission and a right of the Member State to seek their lifting.70 Where,
after regular review or the request of the Member State, the Commission
considers that the conditions of Article 4 are no longer fulﬁlled, it must
submit a proposal to the Council for lifting the adopted measures. Where
it considers that the situation has been remedied in part, it must submit
a proposal for adapting the adopted measures. The ﬁnal decision rests
with the Council which decides by QMV. However, where the Commission considers that the situation has not been remedied, it must adopt a
reasoned decision and inform the Council accordingly.71 It appears that
in such a case the Council cannot lift the measures although the Member State may challenge the Commission’s decision before the CJEU.
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Conclusion
The recovery package adopted in December 2020 should be assessed
positively. It links crisis management with long-term policy priorities, it
introduces collectivisation of debt at Union level, and it is predominated
by EU rather than inter-governmental disciplines. Although the conditionality mechanism, as provided in the Regulation, lacks the long tentacles of the Commission’s initial proposal, the efforts to make it blunter
and more obtuse have only partly succeeded. In terms of substance, it
provides some comfort for the Member States in that it requires a more
direct link between the breaches of the rule of law and the protection of
the ﬁ nancial interests of the Union. In terms of process, it increases the
procedural rights of the Member States and, by replacing reverse QMV
with positive Council action, it increases politicisation at the expense of
technocracy.
The Regulation is a step forward in protecting the rule of law, albeit
more timid than might have been hoped. It is by no means a panacea
for the rule of law crisis that has beset the Union in recent years. Nor is
it a panacea for the protection of EU ﬁnances when threatened by lower level non rule of law related deﬁciencies. The Regulation falls into a
more general model of the EU’s response to the rule of law crisis, namely
strengthening the institutional and regulatory framework to limit deviations by imposing procedural safeguards, recognising new roles for the
institutions, shaping the institutional design, and providing for substantive rules to contain breaches. Whether it will prove efﬁcacious remains
to be seen. It will depend on the willingness of the Member States to
uphold their commitments, the resolve of the other Member States, the
personalities of key actors, and also institutional resilience. Sight should
also not be lost of the fact that, as the EU concentrates more power, the
need to safeguard rule of law principles exists not only in relation to the
Member States but also to the EU institutions.
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